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Abstract—Financial botnets, those specifically aimed at car-
rying out financial fraud, represent a well-known threat for
banking institutions all around the globe. Unfortunately, these
malicious networks are responsible for huge economic losses
or for conducting money laundering operations. Contrary to
DDoS and spam malware, the stealthy nature of financial botnets
requires new techniques and novel research in order to detect,
analyze and even to take them down.
This paper presents a work-in-progress research aimed at
creating a system able to mitigate the financial botnet problem.
The proposed system is based on a novel architecture that has
been validated by one of the biggest savings banks in Spain.
Based on previous experiences with two of the proposed archi-
tecture building blocks -the Dorothy framework and a blacklist-
based IP reputation system-, we show that it is feasible to map
financial botnet networks and to provide a non-deterministic
score to its associated zombies. The proposed architecture also
promotes intelligence information sharing with involved parties
such as law enforcement authorities, ISPs and financial institu-
tions.
Our belief is that these functionalities will prove very useful
to fight financial cybercrime.
Index Terms—botnets; e-crime forensics framework; honeypots
I. INTRODUCTION
A botnet is a network of compromised computers (also
known as zombies) remotely controlled and instructed to
work in a coordinated fashion by one or more central hosts
(known as the command and control nodes or C&Cs). A
computer turned into a zombie has installed on it tools able to
compromise other computers; has remote control mechanisms
enabled, and has joined the botnet network by performing
coordinated actions. Botnets are responsible for severe Internet
threats such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks,
spam campaigns and phishing activities. To a great extent
the epidemic diffusion of malware has been caused by the
spreading activity of botnets as discussed in previous works
[1] [2] [3].
Recently, cybercriminals have begun to target online bank-
ing using botnets not only for DDoS and spam attacks, but
mainly with the purpose of committing financial fraud, like
stealing the credentials of customers. A typical example, is
the Zeus botnet [4] which has compromised around 3.6 million
computers only in the US.
Unfortunately, mitigation mechanisms against financial bot-
nets have been severely impaired by some relevant problems:
• Due to the stealthy nature of financial malwares, they
are difficult to identify and complex to analyze in an
automated way.
• It is difficult and sometimes illegal to obtain the IP
addresses of compromised computers due to existing
privacy legislation [5] [6].
• Many institutions and organizations are reluctant to share
intelligence information about cybercrime cases. This
makes it more difficult to coordinate activities among
ISPs and law enforcement agencies.
• Currently, there is a lack of supporting frameworks (such
as visualization and analysis tools) useful for tracking and
taking down financial botnets.
The aim of this paper is to present the architecture and major
strategic decisions taken during the design of our supporting
framework. The resulting system is based on contributions
from our previous research:
1) A heavily customized version of the open source
Dorothy Framework maintained by the Italian Chapter
of the Honeynet Project [7]. The architecture of Dorothy
[8] is built upon several software modules designed
from scratch and aimed at analyzing malware binaries,
visually representing their network behaviors and report-
ing an incident to the involved parties (i.e. ISPs, law
enforcement agencies and financial institutions) through
a community-oriented online service.
2) A low-latency reputation system [9] based on IP black-
listing. This system is able to provide a scoring mech-
anism for determining the trustworthiness of a given
IP address based on the quality of different blacklists
containing that IP address.
Both the Dorothy Framework and our IP reputation system
have been extended as depicted in Figure 1 with other mod-
ules and features in order to cope with the financial botnet
phenomenon.
Our belief is that the proposed framework will be able to
manage the whole workflow of identifying, analyzing, and
mitigating a financial botnet, ranging from an initial malware
analysis to the creation of specific feedback and knowledge
shared with interested parties cooperating to fight cybercrime.
Besides highlighting the importance of tracking and vi-
sualizing a botnet’s activity, the proposed framework also
contributes a methodology to identify malware that targets
Fig. 1. Overview of the Financial Botnet Framework
financial institutions. It is worth mentioning that very often
commercial solutions offered to financial institutions still
rely on repositories such as ZeusTracker [10] for gathering
information about a botnet, rather than running malware in a
controlled environment and analyzing its actual behavior.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Sections
from II to V describe the architecture of the framework and
show the early performance results obtained. Finally, we draw
conclusions and discuss our future work in Section VI.
II. MALWARE ANALYSIS MODULE
The goal of the Malware Analysis Module (MAM) is to
analyze malware and to discover if it affects a specific financial
institution. If the analyzed malware represents a threat for a
financial institution, then it will be classified as a banking
trojan. Therefore the malware analysis module could also
identify banking trojans that might represent a threat for
several financial institutions.
The framework presented in this paper proposes a new
architecture for analyzing and classifying malware acting as
banking trojans. The rest of this Section explains in more detail
the overall architecture.
A. Characterizing the behavior of a banking trojan
Since configuration files of banking trojans are usually
encrypted with different symmetric algorithms in different
versions of the malware (i.e. this is the case with Zeus), a
manual reverse engineering process of the malware must be
performed in order to find its respective encryption key.
Inspecting the actual configuration of a banking trojan is
useful to verify if it explicitly targets the customers of a
specific financial institution by stealing their online banking
credentials. For example, a Zeus sample could be defined as a
critical banking trojan for the institution X if its configuration
file contains a reference to X (i.e. the URL of the online
banking site of institution X).
Label Description
∆td t3 - t1
∆tu t5 - t3
∆te t5 - t1
TABLE I
TIME PERIODS THAT CHARACTERIZE A BANKING TROJAN
Although this technique may improve the accuracy of anal-
ysis by allowing the content of the encrypted communication
between the infected host and the C&C to be discovered, it
often requires a long time to complete and could be difficult
to achieve. For this reason, we propose an alternative method
that avoids debugging or reverse engineering for determining
if a banking trojan could be reasonably identified as a critical
threat for a specific financial institution. The proposed analysis
technique has been designed in such a way that it might be
executed automatically. A banking trojan behavior could be
summarized by the time flow diagram shown in Figure 2.










Fig. 2. Banking Trojan Behavior
We define the zombified timeframe ∆te as the interval ∆t
between the time of the computer infection by the banking
trojan and the time of the disconnection of the system (or
any other action that makes the system unable to operate as
a zombie). During the zombified timeframe ∆te, two typical
phases of a banking trojan can be recognized: the downloading
phase, whose timeframe is labeled ∆td and the uploading
phase, labeled as ∆tu.
The banking trojan under analysis can then be activated in
a testing environment by either executing a login operation
into a specific online bank or simply when the C&C issues a
special command to it. If the malware is activated during the
time window ∆td, it will download the resources needed for its
subsequent activities. In our preliminary experiments, we have
analyzed the Zeus malware by downloading its configuration
files during ∆td.
Next, in the time window ∆tu the banking trojan will send
the stolen data to its pre-configured drop site (i.e. a remote
site connected to the botnet used for storing data collected by
zombies). Table I summarizes the flow with downloading and
uploading phases.
Fig. 3. Malware Analysis Flow
B. Banking trojan analysis process
The overall process for analyzing malware with the purpose
of determining if it is a banking trojan is shown in Figure 3
and starts when generic malware is downloaded (step 1 in
Figure 3). We propose the use of different virtual machines
(with different OS and versions) to execute the malware and
to track its network activity using a different instance of a
network analyzer for each VM.
Since the VM’s local DNS is configured to resolve the real
bank’s domain name to our local server infrastructure (step
2), all the VMs are then automatically directed to a copy of
the original bank web site that has been configured inside the
local network (steps 3 and 4).
The malware is then allowed to execute in the controlled
environment and, after a preset period of time, the virtual
host is stopped and reverted to its original state by loading
a saved snapshot. According to the the description of banking
trojan behavior given in Subsection II-A, during the ∆td time
window, the infected VM will try to connect to the botnet
infrastructure for downloading supporting files (if needed) and,
during ∆tu for uploading data stolen from the local copy of
the original bank web site (step 5 in Figure 3).
The original Dorothy Framework was developed to ana-
lyze generic malware by using the workstation version of
VMWare [11] virtualization platform. One improvement is
the migration to a Kernel-based Virtual Machine. Unlike the
standard VMWare solution, the proposed architecture does not
run on top of a third-party operating system but is based
on a customized Linux Kernel with an integrated hypervisor
module. This hypervisor is designed to guarantee high levels
of performance for the most resource-intensive applications
and thus sharply reduces the total analysis time of the mal-
ware analysis module. Preliminary tests have shown that the
proposed analysis architecture is capable of analyzing up to
850 malware samples per day.
In the following Subsection we present the Data Extraction
Module (DEM), which is invoked as the next analysis tool with
the purpose of parsing network dump traces obtained during
malware execution.
C. Data Extraction Module
Dorothy’s Data Extraction Module (DEM) was developed to
process the network dump traces recorded during the execution
time of each malware sample. In preliminary versions, specific
focus was devoted to track IRC-based botnets; however, since
most banking trojans use the HTTP/S protocol to communicate
with their C&C servers, the original DEM has been modified to
detect financial botnet C&Cs, drop sites, and Support Delivery
Servers (SDSs) communicating over HTTP/S.
According to the banking trojan flow diagram already
presented in Figure 2, the DEM identifies a drop site by
searching for any POST request performed during the ∆tu
period of time. Some classes of banking trojans use FTP or
emails to send stolen user credentials to drop sites. To detect
them, the customized DEM was also modified to look for these
communication mechanisms.
Financial botnet SDSs are identified by filtering all the target
hosts reached during the ∆td period, in particular by searching
for HTTP GET requests or FTP communications performed by
the infected machine. A C&C usually checks the availability of
a zombie by exchanging with it an echo response verification
packet with variable frequency of transmission. However, this
communication could be exchanged at any time while the
machine is infected and could be encrypted, thus making it
difficult to profile a signature based on its content or time
frequency. Because of this difficulty, C&C identification is
hard to achieve and false positives are likely to occur.
Regarding C&C identification, two strategies have been
used. The first one, relies on an observation we made during
our preliminary tests that show that a C&C is often co-located
with the drop site or the SDS component.
Therefore, IP addresses of identified drop sites and SDSs
may match with those of a C&C.
The second strategy is to consider hosts contacted during
∆te but which have not already been categorized as a drop
site or SDS. In this particular case, we will rely on the IP
reputation module (described in the following Section IV) to
figure out their membership of any available blacklist.
At the end of the data extraction process, the results are
stored in a relational database that is accessed by the following
analysis phases and system modules. The Dorothy Drone for
example retrieves the C&C information from the database
and mimics the behavior of a real zombie by producing the
corresponding replies to all commands received. In this way, it
is possible to establish a stateful connection with the C&C and
to monitor its activity and behavior, such as issued commands
and instructions for downloading binary updates.
Finally, IP addresses associated with botnet components
found by the DEM are also used by the IP reputation system
to feed its own database. The whole collected data can also
be included into a new incident report created via the newly
developed Ticketing System Module presented in Section V.
III. VISUALIZATION MODULE
Previous research with Dorothy [8] proved that displaying
information about the activity of a botnet through link graphs
and geographic maps is a powerful technique to quickly
understand and share knowledge among all the parties involved
in botnet takedown actions.
The framework proposed in this paper relies on a cus-
tomized version of Dorothy’s Data Visualization Module
(DVM) to visualize the information gathered by previous
modules. The goal of the newly customized DVM is to
offer a global picture that summarizes all the information
needed to investigate a financial botnet case (i.e. by law
enforcement agencies). The visualization process has been
modeled according to methodologies described in previous
works [12].
For the purpose of this research, we have designed the
visualization engine based on the following questions:
• Who has been contacted by a zombie machine?
• What communication flow occurred between hosts that
are members of a botnet?
• What has been downloaded or uploaded?
Let us introduce some examples of how advanced visual-
ization features may enhance the analysis and management of
a botnet threat:
• By highlighting the target of HTTP GET/POST requests
performed by the infected machine during ∆tu and ∆td,
it might be possible to intuitively identify both an SDS
and a drop site.
• Based on our practical experience with financial CSIRT1
operations, we have concluded how visualizing informa-
tion about the size of the exchanged data could help the
analyst to identify suspicious communications and focus
on them for further investigations.
• By showing all the hosts contacted during ∆tu we can
also determine which protocols were used by the infected
machine to send stolen data.
The DVM uses the criteria shown in Table II for identifying
the different entities related to a financial botnet.
Finally, the rest of this section presents visualization tech-
niques implemented in the proposed DVM architecture.
1Computer Security Incident Response Team
Entity Detection Method Time
C&C Blacklist Matching ∆te
SDS HTTP GET/FTP Parsing ∆td
Drop site HTTP POST/FTP/SMTP ∆tu
TABLE II
DETECTION METHODS USED FOR ENTITY CATEGORIZATION
A. Link graph
When the DVM accesses data stored in the database through
the MAM (as explained in Section II), it also perfoms parsing
and filtering operations with the purpose of generating a 3-










Fig. 4. Link Graph
The graph depicted in Figure 4 is built using visual trans-
formations from Table III. Size of nodes are proportional
to the number of corresponding entries in the data source.
So the more entries are found, the larger the node size is.
The generated link graph summarizes all the connections
established by the financial zombie under analysis.
Entity Color Shape
C&C Purple Red Circle
Fake Bank Server Dark Blue Triangle
Drop Zone Red Circle
SDS Purple Circle
Services Green Square
Infected VM Light Blue Triangle
Local DNS Light Blue Inverted Triangle
TABLE III
VISUAL TRANSFORMATION GRAPH PROPERTIES
In our preliminary tests, we downloaded several banking
trojans, analyzed all the traffic generated by their respective
zombies using our framework and categorized each zombie
Fig. 5. Heat Map
according to the C&C being contacted. In this way, it was
possible to merge traffic dumps from zombies that were
referring to the same C&C, so the DVM could process it. The
overall outcome of this activity was a graph of the analyzed
botnet, useful in investigation processes related to a particular
financial botnet architecture.
B. Heat maps
In order to visualize the huge amount of IP addresses
gathered by the IP Reputation Module (see Section IV), we
focused our efforts on providing a method for displaying
information that is geographically dispersed (i.e. using heat
maps). A typical heat map generated by our framework is
depicted in Figure 5.
C. Map graph
The original Dorothy Web GUI was customized to allow a
financial CSIRT to easily visualize financial botnets that are
targeting its customers. Our belief is that visualizing C&Cs,
SDSs and drop sites through a geographical map could be an
intuitive and immediate way to show how the financial botnet
network is distributed, which may help in the analysis (as
shown in Figure 6).
For instance, by showing the C&Cs geographical distribu-
tion, a bank’s CSIRT could be helped in defining a strategy
aimed at stopping the botnet’s activity by considering that
different countries have different laws about cybercrime. The
geographical representation could also suggest possible geopo-
litical motivations in operating a financial botnet, apart from
traditional online fraud.
In addition, the interactive map we have contributed offers
the possibility to represent data through different visualization
layers by displaying the information about a selected C&C
such as its own link graph (Section III-A).
Finally, apart from Dorothy Web GUI original panels (Gen-
eral, Charts, and Malware), a Status Panel was added to show
information regarding the Ticketing System Module such as
the first notification that was sent, the recipient of a particular
notification and the status of the related ticket. The Ticketing
System Module will be further described in Section V.
Fig. 6. Geographical Map
IV. IP REPUTATION MODULE
In previous research [9] we proved that it might be possible
to discover IP addresses related to a financial botnet, by com-
bining the information coming from well-known IP blacklists
providers. In order to do so, we developed a set of metrics
(i.e. infection latency) that are able to quantify the quality of a
particular IP blacklist (score or reputation). Formally speaking:
• Let B be a set of all trusted blacklist providers and M a
set of bitmaps.
• Let Mi encode whether a specific IP address was found
inside the blacklist Bi (0 ≤ i ≤ |B|) or not.
Mi =
{
1 if IP ∈ Bi
0 otherwise
• Let δ(IP ) be a reputation function defined as:
δ(IP ) =
{
{∅} if @Bi ∈ B : IP ∈ Bi
{M} otherwise
With the δ function we obtain the reputation of a given IP
address. In summary, the more bits are set as “1” in a bitmap,
the more likely it is that an IP address corresponds to a zombie
host that is a member of a financial botnet.
The following new features are required by the original
IP reputation system in order to use it within the framework
proposed in this paper:
• Storage. All the collected information needs to be sum-
marized inside an AVL tree [13], then it is indexed by
IP address and finally it is stored inside nodes with its
corresponding bitmap M . For our first implementation
(see Figure 7), each node was populated with a 40-
bit tuple 〈IP,M〉 due to the fact that we were only
fetching IP blacklists from 8 different providers. Since
IPv4 addresses are only 32 bits long, it was possible
to store the whole IP address space (up to 4 billion
addresses) in RAM memory with a minimal effort (8 GB
of RAM or even less).
• Performance. The proposed framework should be able
to feed in near real-time anti-fraud systems of financial
institutions. For this reason, we decided not to rely on a
RDBMS for storing IP addresses from malicious hosts.
As shown later in this section, without performing disk
Fig. 7. IP Reputation System Architecture
accesses low-latency is guaranteed at (Θ logn) cost in
the worst-case scenario –lookup operations–.
• Security. The reputation system proposed in [9] needs
to be further extended in order to meet some minimum
trust and security guarantees. If it is meant to be used
outside financial institution boundaries (i.e. by an external
ticketing system), then the IP reputation system responses
should be digitally signed by a trusted third party (just
as happens with protocols such as OCSP [14]).
• Detection rate. It is important to invest more research
in order to improve the IP reputation system detection
rate. As mentioned in [9], future work should take into
account better reputation algorithms along with the effect
of dynamic IP addresses –DHCP–.
The above-mentioned features allow us to use the IP repu-
tation system with other modules of the proposed framework
(i.e. to feed the Ticketing System Module). As a result of this,
ISPs could be able to apply long-term filters to IP addresses
with bad reputation. As has been mentioned in Section II,
the IP reputation system would be able to receive and send
information to the Malware Analysis Module (see Section II).
So far our research has demonstrated the performance of
our first IP reputation system implementation. As expected,
RAM memory is extremely unlikely to be accessed and for
this reason if we discard overhead latencies such as I/O
interrupt handling or the code parsing performed inside the
Linux Kernel, the average obtained lookup latency is roughly
8µs. If we consider workloads that are less than 50 million IP
addresses, it is possible to achieve a 99% hit rate in caches. In
order to prove this hypothesis, we have made measurements
with the OProfile [15] Linux Kernel module and the CPU
performance counters. Table IV shows the obtained results for
a 50 million IPv4 address workload.
V. TICKETING SYSTEM MODULE
Once a financial botnet has been automatically discovered
by the analysis performed during the Malware Analysis Mod-
ule (see Section II), it is necessary to send notifications to
all the involved parties such as banks, ISPs, ccTLD registrars,
antivirus software companies and law enforcement agencies.
Total Accesses Read Write
DCache Refs. 50.9M 36.2M 14.7M
DCache Misses 0.52M 0.39M 0.13M
L2 Misses 0.24M 0.12M 0.12M
DCache Miss Rate 1% 1% 0.8%
L2 Miss Rate 0.4% 0.3% 0.1%
L2 Refs. 0.53M 0.4M 0.13M
L2 Misses 0.25M 0.13M 0.12M
L2 Miss Rate 0.1% 0% 0.8%
TABLE IV
CACHE BEHAVIOR FOR 50 MILLION IP ADDRESSES
Since each entity has a different role, the only way to be suc-
cessful in neutralizing botnet infrastructures and arresting the
criminals who are running them is by promoting an efficient
coordination among the different authorities. For this purpose,
an email-based notification system has been developed inside
the Ticketing System Module (TSM).
Fig. 8. Ticket Workflow
As depicted in Figure 8, the bank’s CSIRT starts the
workflow by requesting a new malware analysis from the
MAM (see Section II). Malware samples sent by e-mail are
then automatically analyzed (steps 2 and 3 in Figure 8) and a
preliminary report is attached for later revision. This report is
encoded in XML [16] following the rules defined by the IEEE-
SA Industry Connections Malware Working Group (ICSG).
Once all the intelligence information has been gathered, a
new ticket is created and returned to the bank’s CSIRT (step
5 in Figure 8).
If the malware analysis process has identified a banking
trojan as a real threat for several financial institutions (with
the methods described in II-A), then another set of tickets is
created (a newer one for each one of the newly discovered
C&C IP addresses and domains).
All tickets generated by the TSM after a C&C IP address has
been discovered, are sent to the security providers of financial
institutions who are in charge of mitigating financial malware
(steps 8-10 in Figure 8). This is a realistic assumption taking
into account our practical experience with financial CSIRTs.
In fact, we have learnt that in most cases, such security
providers are broadband and telecommunications companies
which are able to adopt an appropriate mitigation strategy (i.e.
sinkholing of botnet domains and blacklisting of C&C’s IP
addresses).
Since most of the DSL/Cable/FTTH equipment deployed
at subscribers’ homes are often configured by default with
DNS and gateway IP addresses provided by the broadband
companies, it is possible to quickly mitigate the impact of a
financial botnet just by blocking malicious IP addresses and
domains at the ISP level (steps 8-10 in Figure 8).
In parallel with this action, a notification email is automat-
ically sent to the affected ccTLD just by performing a query
at WHOIS servers with the purpose of obtaining contact email
addresses from the Abuse records (step 7).
Ensuring privacy when exchanging sensitive information
between financial instutions, the different law enforcement
agencies and ISPs have also been considered during the design
phase of the Ticketing System Module. All emails sent by the
TSM (with the expection of those sent to untrusted ccTLDs)
are encrypted and signed using public key cryptography
(OpenPGP [17]).
Finally, when an incident case has been solved (steps 10-
11 in Figure 8), closed tickets are stored in a database with
the purpose of building a solid knowledgebase for further
investigations and for producing statistics of the amount of
time employed in neutralizing botnet infrastructures.
At this point, all collected information can be used by the
law enforcement authorities for starting legal actions against
cybercriminals.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have introduced a novel framework to
detect, visualize and in general to share intelligence about
financial botnets. Such a system would greatly help to mitigate
this threat by sharing information among different parties,
ranging from financial institutions’ antifraud systems (IP Rep-
utation Module) to law enforcement authorities (i.e. via the
Visualization Module). This research contributed a new way
to automatically analyze generic malware and to categorize it
as a banking trojan.
Despite this being a work-in-progress research, our pre-
liminary implementation of the proposed modules proves the
usefulness of these tools for mitigating the threat posed by
financial botnets. Due to their stealthy nature and uncommon
behavior, financial botnets should be addressed differently
from traditional botnets characterized by DDoS and spam
activity.
Our future work will be focused on adding new features
to the system such as improving the different mechanisms
used for detecting compromised computers through new repu-
tation/scoring algorithms and fusing information provided by
both ISPs and blacklist providers.
In addition, the Ticketing Module will add support for the
new Instant Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF)
[18] extensions, recently released with the purpose of defining
a XML standard for reporting e-crime incidents [19].
We are also exploring new technologies that might allow us
to deploy this system in such a way that intelligence sharing
may be facilitated. In particular, we are referring to cloud-
based implementations whose scalability and dynamics may
let this system meet higher performance requirements that will
enable graphical representations of large botnets.
Finally, future enhancements of the Ticketing Module, will
involve the use of text-to-speech (TTS) technology for per-
forming automated voice calls to both Domain Registrars and
ccTLDs with the phone numbers retrieved from the WHOIS
records.
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